The spotlight is once again on the value of Western armed forces’ presence on the ground in maintaining peace and security. Such value is the product both of current developments in counter-insurgency doctrine within those forces, and of practices acquired in peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations in the 1990s. Contemporary discussion on the commitment of forces to stabilisation operations shows that political circles and society in general find the reality hard to accept. Indeed, the contrary would appear to be true: broad coalitions of civilian and military decision-makers, pacifist associations and respected universities are being formed against any lasting or visible military presence after initial intervention. Thus there is a contradiction: on the one hand, military staffs are considering how best to drive events towards peace, whilst on the other they are not being given the assets or legitimacy to put their proposals into action.

The ‘Antibody’ Doctrine in Iraq: Westerners Equals
Occupation Forces?

In order to understand and untangle this contradiction, we clearly need to examine the argument against the continuing and visible presence of Western military forces among the populations concerned. We will then be in a position to understand what is at stake and consider its relevance, and from it draw concrete lessons. In this article I intend to look at the idea by which Western forces are seen as a foreign body (to draw on medical terminology) that has appeared in the very flesh of fundamentally different societies, and by which such military presence is actually inflaming armed reaction against it. In recent military history, it was this idea that inspired General John Abizaid, the commander of US CENTCOM forces between July 2003 and the end of 2006. General Abizaid is of Lebanese origin and speaks Arabic. During his time in command he formulated the doctrine known as antibody doctrine, according to which US forces had to operate with minimum visibility, leaving the Iraqi security forces that they had trained in charge of combating insurgents. The influence of the antibody doctrine on tactical and strategic procedures during those years stemmed not only from its author’s position in the hierarchy but also from his moral authority as one of the rare decision-makers in the US forces with an Arab background.

In light of their previous experience in Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo, American military forces deployed in Iraq themselves took the initiative to embark on military presence missions. It is in these that we see mounted or dismounted patrols, the single common factor among units which otherwise have widely differing procedures. That said, these differences have been reducing since the introduction of new strategic imperatives under General George Casey, who commanded the coalition forces from 2004 to 2006. He decided that his aim would be to create an Iraqi army on the US model, in anticipation of a future transfer of responsibility for security to the legitimately elected authorities of the new Iraq. In 2005, General Casey decided to transfer the burden of training the Iraqi army to American units, each being tasked with creating a partnership with an Iraqi unit.