The creation of a Defence and National Security Council (CDSN) as announced in the White Paper signals the first recognition of national security, a concept that has previously figured rarely in French law, and notes the interpenetration of the notions of internal and external security. This new concept must cover defence policy, and internal and civil security policy. In any event, it sheds some long-awaited legal light on the question of responsibilities in defence matters.
After the White Paper: News Responsibilities for Defence
In a speech on defence on 7 March 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy, then a presidential candidate, announced the creation of a National Security Council whose form he went on to outline a few weeks later in a specialist publication. This Council is to become ‘the sole authority for analysis, debate and study of all matters relating to security and defence, in both normal times as well as in periods of crisis. This authority will be empowered to substitute for the current internal security and defence committees, adopting structures appropriate to subjects and circumstances. It will provide the Head of State with an overview embracing the three primary dimensions of our defence policy: territorial security, military defence and external action. This Council will be supported by a permanent secretariat that will make arrangements for meetings and will be tasked with following up any decisions taken. I must emphasise that it should be ready to operate as a forum for discussions between government officials, heads of departments concerned and experts, and not as a chamber for the recording of decisions taken by a small group. I believe it is essential for the President of the Republic to have access to all the specialist advice and second opinions he needs to make his decisions.’(1) As soon as it was announced, the resemblance of this project to the White House’s National Security Council was clear, just as the 2002 version of the Internal Security Council (CSI) was seen as a French imitation of the United States in the area of administrative organisation.(2) During his speech on defence and national security on 17 June 2008, the President confirmed the creation of this body. The committee charged with the production of the White Paper on defence and national security, set up by a decree of 30 July 2007 and headed by Jean-Claude Mallet, a former Secretary-General for Defence, laid down overall guidance for what was to become the Defence and National Security Council (CDSN). In his speech before Parliament on 26 June 2008 on the White Paper, the Prime Minister confirmed this project, which calls for a rethinking of ideas on security and defence.
The Defence and National Security Council
The creation of the CDSN was announced at the launch of the third defence White Paper under the Fifth Republic, following those of 1972 (on deterrence) and 1994 (on projection). The area of responsibility of the CDSN covers what might be expected for a body intended to grapple with the whole spectrum of security and defence. It must also cover all questions and public policy involving defence and national security which the Constitution attributes to the President. The country will therefore have available, at the highest level, a forum in which subjects such as military financial planning, deterrence policy, internal security as related to national security, the fight against terrorism and planning for major crises can be addressed, with all their implications. Apart from the President and the Prime Minister, the council will include the foreign and European affairs, interior, defence, economy and finance ministers.
The merging of the CSI and the Defence Council, as candidate Sarkozy envisaged, is no longer an issue, only the former bearing the brunt of the of the CDSN’s creation. The authors of the White Paper plan on repealing Decree No. 2002-890 of 15 May 2002 relating to the CSI, which itself had superseded the Decree creating the Council (No. 97-152 of 18 November 1997). The limited life of these councils is not an indication of the short-term nature of security concerns but does betray power struggles. In 1997, under the third ‘cohabitation’ of the Fifth Republic, the CSI, wrongly presented(3) as an unprecedented creation in French institutional life, was headed by the Prime Minister, thus excluding the Head of State. There were reservations expressed at the time that ‘military defence should alone be left under the direction of the President of the Republic whilst all the rest, including internal security, would be devolved to the Prime Minister, and exclusively to him.’(4) Apart from the exclusion of the Head of State from a domain which was to become the main theme of the 2002 presidential election, the terminology employed in Decree No. 97-152 was criticised on the grounds that it placed the Prime Minister at the head of a council, whereas the letter and the spirit of the 4 October 1958 Constitution reserved the term ‘council’ for meetings presided over by the Head of State. This usage is observed for the Council of Ministers and the Higher Council for National Defence (Articles 9 and 15 of the Constitution). The term ‘committee’ was therefore more appropriate. However, in 2002 the CSI was placed under the presidency of the Head of State. Although opposition to this move was determined,(5) The fact that the direction taken by internal security policy is decided by the President conforms to the trend of institutions moving towards a strengthened role for the Presidency. It is true that the periods of cohabitation have favoured attempts by the Prime Minister to limit the concept of defence in order not to lose influence over internal security matters. The suppression of an attack on a gendarmerie detachment by native inhabitants of New Caledonia on 5 May 1998 on Jacques Chirac’s orders as Prime Minister, without interference from the Elysée, is a striking example of this.
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