Ukraine considered it appropriate to become involved in the Malian conflict in order to destabilise Russia, which was supporting the Malian junta. Despite a difficult start as a result of lack of mutual understanding, the battle of Tinzaouaten in July 2024 was a turning point, with the defeat of Russian-supported Malian troops.
The African Front of the Russia-Ukraine War
How the battle of Tinzaouaten changed the conflict in Mali and Ukrainian Commitment to Africa
Since Russia launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian government has sought international support in its fight against Russia, particularly from the “Global South.” In order to gain the support of African countries, the Ukrainian government has invested more in its bilateral diplomatic efforts, while also working with numerous institutions. However, to the surprise of Ukrainians, the impact of these efforts between 2022 and 2024 remained limited, largely due to the existing ties between African governments and Russia. And although sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause, the support Ukraine receives created some resentment fueled by what African governments justifiably interpret as another proof of Western double standards on security issues.
The opportunism of Ukraine and the Tuareg movements in the aftermath of the Battle of Tinzaouaten (July 25-27, 2024) broke this pattern and created new opportunities for Ukraine in Africa. By declaring its support for the Tuareg and suggesting that it may have played a role in their success, the Ukrainian government simultaneously amplified Russia’s defeat, undermined Russia’s military credibility and created a network of African allies, who themselves took advantage of the situation to alter the dynamics of their local conflicts. Thanks to this support, Ukraine’s message in Africa has become more effective in countering Russian propaganda in the region.
This article suggests that by aligning itself with opposition groups and adopting a more opportunistic communication strategy, Ukraine has given itself the tools to undermine Russia in the Sahel and elsewhere in Africa. Furthermore, this same opportunism displayed by Tuareg movements has changed the conflict in the Sahel and could change proxy warfare tactics.
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