Today’s computer simulation models terrain and friendly and enemy units, and provides for operational preparation of forces. Such simulation has long been well designed for conventional combat in open areas, but now has to face up to an additional and pressing necessity to prepare units to confront not only increasingly complex situations in populated areas but also an unconventional enemy. This article looks at new behavioural simulation systems and describes how technology attempts to respond to this challenge whilst still serving man.
If it's not War, it's Simulation
Modern Western forces no longer appear to have an enemy on their level, that is, a symmetrical enemy. Despite their apparent superiority, forces deployed in crisis zones seem incapable of restoring peace—at least, not quickly and by themselves. It is therefore tempting to ask whether technology has reached its limits or even whether it has fooled man as to its true capabilities. We need to examine whether this apparent contradiction is perhaps a little excessive and whether technology, like man himself, needs to be adapted to the changing situation. In limiting ourselves to the field of simulation, we are seeking to show to what degree technology still has a role to play and how this can help the soldier and the commander to prepare themselves better for this new era of conflict. Having shown the pivotal role that man plays in current conflicts, as well as that played by simulation in the preparation of forces today, we will look at some major developments yet to come in this field.
Man at the centre of the action
To say that man is at the centre of current conflicts is nothing new and a statement of the obvious. Nevertheless, contemporary conflicts and man’s role in them are such that the statement is truer than ever today. In a symmetrical confrontation, the main aim is to destroy one’s adversary to a sufficient degree that he gives up either the fight or some territory. But even if this aim is achieved, the military force could still face resistance strong enough to reverse the situation—the more so if such resistance has outside help. Recent developments stem both from the actions of populations and also from those of the media. Today’s enemy has learned to exploit a strategy which overcomes his weakness in the traditional sense of armed forces and puts modern forces and their commanders in highly complex situations.
In carrying his offensive into urban zones and in attacking all kinds of targets, even the most indefensible (women and children), the enemy has also learned how to divert troops onto terrain that puts them at a disadvantage. At the same time, the permanent presence of the media in these areas tends to amplify the magnitude of events and puts a brake on the freedom of action so needed by the military commander. Sometimes victim and sometimes compliant, the population in general finds itself more than ever the pawn in the game. This new strategy, and the terrorist tactics which it engenders, are now forcing military commanders and their forces to face up to a completely new style of conflict. The military force may have to experience combat of widely varying intensity and nature simultaneously at different points in the same theatre or successively at the same point. Hence commanders at the different levels must have a heightened sense of the situation and remain highly flexible in their response. The least error could lead to serious consequences, in particular because it risks being amplified [by the press] and on occasion drawn to the attention of the government. Such operational complexity therefore requires changes to the preparation of troops, be it in their instruction or their practical training. Even if traditional know-how is not being called into question, what is sure is that new skills have to be learned. The build-up of any force before its deployment has to assume that it will face any or all of these possible situations right from the start.
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