Throughout its long history NATO has both experienced and survived internal crises. The 2002-03 ‘family quarrel’ over Iraq, when Alliance cohesion was severely tested, certainly qualifies as one of these seismic events. And although it is one of the reasons why Alliance members struggled last year to reach an agreement on the Comprehensive Political Guidance to be presented at this month’s Riga summit, it is not the only reason. The broad transformations the Alliance underwent in the late 1990s and after 11 September 2001 are also important factors. If NATO members have managed to adapt their political and military capabilities to these two particular transformations, they have done so to varying degrees and at their own pace.⁽¹⁾ As a result, one might argue that the tensions that exist within NATO today are attributable not only to the lingering consequences of the Iraq crisis, but also to a lack of synchronisation in Alliance-wide transformation, has which affected the Allies’ cohesion.

Critics of the Alliance need to remember this particular synchronisation problem whenever they deplore its shortcomings of the moment. They also need to celebrate the Alliance’s undeniable accomplishments over the last 15 years. Today’s NATO, for example, does not hesitate to operate ‘out of area’; it now applies its Article 5 provisions to state and non-state actors alike, particularly in the case of terrorism; it continues to make progress in its constructive, albeit fragile, working relationship with Russia; its far-flung engagement in Afghanistan paved the way for decisive national elections, despite the problems of operating in such a complex security environment; its planning support for coalition forces in Iraq marked the beginning of a NATO presence in the Middle East, which now includes helping train Iraqi security forces; and the NATO Response Force (NRF), which is almost fully operational, will permit Brussels to tailor its responses to a new range of challenges, including natural disasters such as the hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in September 2005 and then the Pakistan earthquake the following month.

Yes, NATO’s sceptics need to acknowledge the above transformational successes, but they are also right to point out that the past is not necessarily prologue–i.e. past adaptation does not automatically mean future relevance. For the Alliance to remain a useful security organisation in the twenty-first century, its now 26 members need to clarify further the different visions that exist over the nature and purpose of the organisation.