On 3 July 2006, the French Senate published a report by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee on the management of African crises, summarising the French position in this area and setting out the fundamentals that will determine French doctrine in the years to come. In a context marked by an assertive African Union and the European Union’s growing involvement, this document explains France’s change of course in its relations with a continent which has greatly changed since the end of the Cold War.
The management of African crises: towards a clarification of French doctrine
. . . More than a simple report, a document published by the Senate on 3 July 2006(1) is a clear statement of the principles of a renewed French strategy aimed at contributing to stability on the African continent. It does much to clarify the French position. Since the end of the 1990s the reorientation of French strategy in Africa has been influenced by a difficult and unstable context but rests on principles which need to be appreciated. The strategy is built around the key concepts of an African takeover and multilateral crisis management, and is aimed at making regional organisations and the European Union the principal actors in the management of African crises. It is also founded on a partnership ethos yet to be developed, in which South Africa will have a privileged place.
The Difficult Management of African Crises by France and the United Nations
A Context of Continual Crises and New Actors
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the rapporteurs note a proliferation of new actors on the African continent such as ‘. . . growing activity there on the part of the United States, China and India. The causes of this are varied: the wealth of raw materials and energy are of interest while the instability of the continent is worrying.’ In addition, in ‘. . . 2003, 20 per cent of the population of the continent and 15 states out of 54 were affected by war’. It is noteworthy that the term ‘war’ is not defined, even though its forms and expressions are extremely complex on the African continent.
After the trauma of Rwanda, the implosion of the regime of President Mobutu and the accelerated disintegration of the spheres of influence inherited from independence consequent on the end of the Cold War, France sought a position more in step with the expectations of African populations. As soon as ‘France no longer intended to be the “gendarme of Africa” ’, a change of course was inevitable. Towards the middle of the 1990s there appeared ‘. . . new political axes: normalisation of relations with former colonies, multilateralism and Franco-African partnership,’ Although ‘indifference is not an option and . . . external intervention may be necessary, sometimes in the form of military intervention . . .’, this might have limits: ‘military intervention never [permanently] resolves a conflict. Experienced as a form of intrusion, it may be the germ of more instability’.
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