Violent conflict is more than ever the order of the day. It is heralded or initiated by various crises which are, in reality, subsidiary forms of real wars, as is terrorism. France is not safe from the menaces which increasingly threaten the whole world. Its vigilance and ability to react must be maintained at the level necessary for its survival. Since France’s major or even vital interests are at stake, it is important to possess a suitable military tool. In designing our national defence for the 15 or 20 years to come, it would seem useful to define the pitfalls to avoid or well-known impossibilities. Among these, without being exhaustive, the utopian and the specialised solution stand out.

The Utopian Solution

The first mistake consists in persuading oneself, before the time limit in question has been reached, that the objective has been attained—a community of perfect defence in which each state specialises in a particular function or area, ‘all for one, one for all’. But what if one finds oneself alone? It is true that from the moment when French budgetary constraints affect the maintenance of a range of operational capabilities covering the whole spectrum of military operations, it might be tempting to abandon one or more of them in favour of a mutualised European defence, or even an integrated European force. This stage has not been reached yet. It is a very distant goal bordering on utopia. It is clear that in Europe’s present political state it is unreasonable to expect dividends from this approach in the next 20 years. The mutualisation of forces or, even more, the creation of a European defence force, can only be feasible in the context of an integrated defence, which presupposes a federal type of political system. On the other hand, the existing common policy on the defence industry and command relationships must be not only continued but strengthened.

The ‘Specialised’ Solution

The specialised solution groups together errors which consist in dividing or segmenting conflicts and crises, and include:

• The ‘over-reliance on technology’ approach. This over-simplified view is supported by industrial lobbies and Western societies which are not prepared to risk their human capital.
• The ‘crisis management’ approach. This very limited approach by definition excludes any escalation to extremes. The danger here is that budgetary constraints make this approach attractive.
• The ‘humanitarian’ approach. This attempts to resolve crises and conflicts using humanitarian resources only, accepting postponement of armed intervention to the point where the situation deteriorates and the effectiveness of any such intervention is lost.
• The ‘war on terrorism’ approach. This faithfully reflects the model imposed by the United States on the thought and actions of its allies. It ought to be assessed with greater discernment by the numerous supporters of American policy to whom it serves as a conceptual crutch, since it could lead France to commit itself to armed conflicts which do not concern its major interests, even indirectly.

France must at all costs avoid giving up the smallest operational capability during the two decades to come. It must not, above all, prematurely reduce its capabilities on the basis of an illusion of European defence. It is by remaining strong that it can best maintain its contribution to the growth of European defence and remain credible in the Atlantic Alliance.♦