In a speech in Cherbourg on 21 March 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy said that his ‘... first duty as Head of State and Head of the Armed Forces is to ensure that France, its territory, its people and its republican institutions are secure in all circumstances. And that in all circumstances, our national independence and decision-making autonomy are preserved. Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee of that.’⁽¹⁾

After restating the traditional elements of French doctrine, he also referred to new risks brought about by proliferation and new threats: ‘... other threats put pressure on our security, he said. Certain nuclear arsenals continue to grow. Nuclear proliferation and proliferation of biological and chemical weapons continues, as does that of ballistic and cruise missiles... we must also be ready to face up to risks other than proliferation. There is no limit to the imagination of our potential aggressors in exploiting the vulnerabilities of Western societies. In the future, technological progress could create new threats. That is why we maintain our nuclear deterrent.’

When designing a new doctrine of deterrence, how should we take into account a regional enemy power, whether a state actor or not, possessing biological, chemical or nuclear weapons and appropriate launch vehicles, and which uses asymmetrical or terrorist action groups? How should we face up to this risk to our vital interests in a situation far removed from deterrence of the strong by the weak as at the time of the Soviet threat, whilst retaining strategic autonomy and national independence?