France-Otan, les sujets demeurent : Europe et Atlantique, indépendance et solidarité ; mais le contexte a changé. Quelles conséquences pour la France ? L’Otan, avec qui, pour quoi faire ? Rentrer dans l’organisation militaire intégrée servirait-il ou desservirait-il l’Europe de la défense ? Le problème général des relations franco-américaines n’est pas celui de l’Otan. Sauvegarder en tout cas notre indépendance, fondement aux yeux du monde de notre politique étrangère depuis un demi-siècle.
The Evolution of NATO, and France's Position
The problem of France’s position within NATO is not a new one. It goes back not merely to the 1960s, but to the late 1940s, and it has revolved endlessly around two principal themes: Europe/Atlantic, and independence/solidarity, against a background of Franco-American relations, always difficult, or at any rate never simple.
Europe/Atlantic
In 1948, at the time of the Brussels Pact, which paved the way for NATO in the following year, there were already, in France, two tendencies: that of President Auriol, of Paul Ramadier, of Robert Schuman and of General de Lattre, who wanted to give priority to Europe, its own interests, its own defence; and that of Georges Bidault and Marshal Juin, who favoured an Atlantic strategy, with a peripheral status for Europe.
The period of the Fourth Republic was marked by problems, often acute, between France, the United States and NATO.
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