In the spring of 2009, South Africa will be holding its fourth legislative election since the restoration of democracy in 1994. The newly elected legislature will then select a successor to Thabo Mbeki,⁽¹⁾ elected in 1999 after the five years of Nelson Mandela’s presidency. Relations between France and post-apartheid South Africa, the leading economic power on the continent, have developed positively over recent years, after a period of mutual mistrust. The visit by Nicolas Sarkozy in February 2008, followed by the holding of the second EU-South Africa summit in Bordeaux in July 2008, are symptomatic of this diplomatic rapprochement.

Between 1961, when South Africa became independent, and the middle of the 1980s, relations with France were mostly close, driven by shared interests, the battle against the expansion of communism in Africa and fruitful economic cooperation. With the dismantling of apartheid, followed by the election of Nelson Mandela, relations between Paris and Pretoria became strained. South Africa viewed France as a neocolonialist power and a potential economic competitor. South Africa has been visited by only three presidents over a period of nearly 15 years: François Mitterrand (1994), Jacques Chirac (1998) and now Nicolas Sarkozy. However, since the election of Thabo Mbeki in 1999, the two nations have become progressively more aware of their mutual interests.

South Africa, despite its status as a dominion within the British Empire, soon developed close relations with France at the beginning of the 1960s. The brutal institutional break with Britain⁽²⁾ resulted in South Africa seeking a partner that shared its concerns for political stability on the African continent. Starting in the 1960s, Paris and Pretoria developed close military cooperation that led to the delivery of Daphne and Agosta-class submarines, Mirage aircraft and Alouette helicopters, followed in 1971 by Crotale missiles. These military links continued more discreetly until the end of the 1980s, despite the adoption of international sanctions by the United Nations (Resolution 418 in November 1977 introduced an embargo on the sale of weapons to South Africa) followed by EEC sanctions in 1985 and 1986. The victory of François Mitterrand in 1981 did not prevent Framatome from completing the construction of two reactors in the Koeberg nuclear facility, followed by the delivery of Puma helicopters during the first ‘cohabitation’. While this attitude might appear surprising in the light of the democratic values espoused by France, realpolitik always held sway. The battle against the Soviet Union and its satellites, in this case Angola, justified these actions, and French companies were determined to honour contracts with a legitimate regime. The position of Paris was therefore similar to that of Washington. France appeared to have a limited commitment to fighting racial discrimination, and the Pretoria government had influential links with the French government. The assassins of Dulcie September, the ANC⁽³⁾ representative in Paris, killed in March 1988, were highly likely to have enjoyed the complicity of certain ‘French secret agents’.⁽⁴⁾ The crime remains unpunished to this day. When the apartheid system was finally abolished in 1991, France therefore emerged as compromised with the old regime. At the start of the 1990s, the position of France in South Africa deteriorated and the visit by François Mitterrand in July 1994 did little to re-establish its influence in the country. Despite certain signs of reconciliation, especially with the state visit by Nelson Mandela to Paris in July 1996, a certain suspicion would remain between the two countries, prolonged by several commercial disputes, mainly related to agriculture.