When, at the end of April 2007, the Estonian authorities decided to move a controversial statue depicting a Soviet soldier glorified for having participated in the war against Nazi fascism, the consequent rioting of the Russian-speaking inhabitants reawakened fears of a subversive attack by Russia. The alleged mistreatment of the Russian-speaking population would serve as a pretext for Russia to intervene militarily in the former Soviet Republic. Straightaway Estonia looked to Washington for military support in the event that its firm stance against Russia degenerate into open conflict. This ‘battered child’ syndrome is certainly not the prerogative of the Baltic States, as is witnessed by the turning towards the Atlantic by all sides of the Central and East European Countries (CEEC). What may distinguish the Baltic States even more was their achievement in firstly joining NATO on 29 March 2004, and then the European Union on 1 May of the same year, despite the fact that Moscow has never since the early 1990s hidden its view that such actions would automatically constitute a casus belli.

The keys to the success of the Baltic States’ Atlantic and European strategy are to be found in the strong relationship that exists between their Western identity and their strategic decisions. This harmony of military and identity perception thus explains their tendency to see both the European and transatlantic models as completely similar and complementary. Traumatised by 50 years of Soviet annexation, the three Baltic States, in seeking to achieve a sort of ‘life insurance’ against a resurgence of Russian imperialism, believed their security and defence could only lie with the Atlantic Alliance, which they applied to join immediately following their independence, for its primary article of collective defence. A certain dualistic contrast characterised their strategy: NATO, by virtue of its Article 5, would provide the ultimate guarantee of ‘military security’, whilst the EU would furnish the economic wellbeing to which they aspired. Whereas the Atlantic Alliance, in which they placed their hopes of a permanent defence, appeared to be the most credible and above all the most dissuasive security device to contain a belligerent Russian posture, the EU was perceived primarily as an economic organisation and, in any event, devoid of strategic ambitions. In fact, their desire to belong to NATO seemed to answer the crucial need for military security whilst the requirement for integration within Europe would have a structuring effect upon Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian society: one eye turned towards Washington and NATO, symbols of their defence, and the other towards the EU, the guarantee of their European integration.

The Western Icon in Between the European and Transatlantic Models

The more or less unconscious refusal of the Baltic States to differentiate between Europe and the United States has its roots more in historical and cultural traditions than in the supposed inexistence of the European political project. Considerable Baltic emigration to the United States has created certain affinities between the two sides of the Atlantic and powerful lobbies in American political life. There is also the history of the Cold War from which they retain memories almost entirely linked to the United States; in contrast, the desertion of the democracies of Eastern Europe by the European countries shortly before the Second World War (the ‘Munich syndrome’), increases the distrust they feel for West European countries, and at the same time reinforces their confidence in the United States, which they consider to have been the nation that overcame the Soviet Union. Incidentally, during the American campaign designed to legitimise the military intervention in Iraq, the argument to overthrow Saddam Hussein which recalled the prevarication of the League of Nations with respect to Nazi Germany had a considerable impact within certain Baltic States. Another deciding factor was that Washington offered not only its protection, but also an ultraliberal economic model to those countries who were slowly recovering from the adverse effects of Soviet planning.