The 2007 elections showed a willingness by the French people to make a break with their model of society dating from May 1968. Since that date, defence policy has been stamped with pacifist ideology. Redrafting the defence White Paper is on the agenda: it will be the chance to make this break a reality by, for example, defining the terrorist threat more pragmatically and redefining the international legal framework for intervention of France’s armed forces.
The Necessary Reform of French Defence Policy
On 6 July 1830, Admiral Duperré, who was commanding the squadron off Algiers, sent the following signal to the Minister for the Navy: ‘The King’s army has triumphed. The future of Algiers was decided yesterday. The King’s flag flies over the entire fort and over the palace of the Dey. The centuries-old European problem has been resolved.’ This operation, aimed at forcing the Dey to halt all acts of piracy against European interests, was decided upon as part of an overall policy whose ambition was to put an end to the revolutionary process started in 1789. If this process had continued, France would today be in a universe resembling a concentration camp whose laws would reflect those of Brave New World–a world that would all too easily put up with piracy in all quarters.
Indeed, any revolution that is not stopped deliberately will continue to move inexorably in the same direction, step by step and day by day. Since 1789 there have been other revolutionary movements, the latest of which dates from May 1968 and is still in progress. The recent national elections showed a strong willingness among the French to put an end to it or, to put it in other words from the conventional political vocabulary, to provoke a reaction. In the light of this, it is a good moment to consider the reform that will have to be undertaken with regard to the defence of our vital interests.
Since his election, it seems that the President of the Republic has made no secret of his desire to follow this policy line. While the means may be pragmatic, the aim will be a complete break with May 1968. As far as we are concerned, the means will certainly have consequences for the roles of different organisations, albeit such considerations will in the end only have a structural impact. The end-state of this rupture is political and has two aspects: the role of the Armed Forces, and the budget they should be given–in other words, the why and the how. Since the method of defining this is to be pragmatic, let us consider that the how shall be defined by the why, and look here just at the redefinition of defence policy.
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