On 9 October 2006 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced that it had carried out a nuclear test at Hwadeari in Hamgyong province in the east of the country. It is henceforth in a strong position in the strategic dialogue begun on 28 August 2003 with the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea. The negotiations of the Six, whose final objective is the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, have demonstrated their inability to block North Korean policy. Should the dialogue ever resume, North Korea will be able to demand a very high price for any abandonment of its nuclear weapons.

          On 31 October it agreed to return to the negotiating table one year after having left it. However, it is now stronger and more self-assured.

For the time being, nuclear proliferation is on the increase; the Iranian crises and North Korea’s arrival in the nuclear club remind each of us of the reality of an unstable international environment. The adoption of Resolution 1718 by the UN Security Council established an embargo on sensitive material; it also demonstrated that the international community was unable to prevent North Korea from pursuing its nuclear programme. It is true that aspects of the international political context can explain these difficulties: for instance, the sustained (and now durable) presence of the United States in Iraq, combined with the Chinese policy of avoiding a complete break with the totalitarian regime of Kim Jong Il so as to prevent allies of the United States gaining influence over the entire Korean peninsula. Let us not forget, either, that the next UN Secretary-General is to be the former Foreign Minister of South Korea–a real slap in the face for Pyongyang. Russia will also be able to plan on establishing a sort of equilibrium on its Asian flank with China by using North Korea. The DPRK has been able to exploit all of these factors.