Was the 2005 referendum on the EU’s draft Constitutional Treaty a temporary hitch or a turning-point in an historical process which has been under way since 1950? It is unthinkable to accept the second hypothesis. In this respect, the precedent of the rejection of the Constitution is encouraging, because the process has subsequently revived. But one must take care: is it realistic to accept, as many politicians do at the moment, the idea that by virtue of the irrational system of rotating presidencies the French presidency in 2008, which will be prepared by others, notably the Germans, will miraculously resolve matters as if by magic, at the same time that a new European Parliament is elected? This dream scenario is not out of the question but it is far from certain.

Failure

The setback to the constitutional project is not a chance phenomenon. It has causes which deserve to be examined. There are first of all the multiple negative effects of successive enlargements which, as their number has grown, have highlighted the inadequacy of Community funding, which the member states have refused to increase. This has undermined the credibility of the integration project and spawned countless fantasies. There is the phenomenon, hard to comprehend but real, of ‘euro-fatigue’. Since 2001 optimists have responded to exasperation with the bureaucracy, to the unsatisfied claims of ‘subsidiarity’ and to worries over enlargement by countering: ‘there is the euro’. In fact, the creation of the single currency was a remarkable leap forward. But since the May 2005 elections a campaign has been launched against the euro that is in full cry today and the press, both daily papers and economic publications, with the British leading the way, contributes obligingly. The cost of living, unemployment, stagnating exports–the euro is blamed for everything. And even moderate politicians of both sides accuse the European Central Bank of a monetary policy that is unfavourable to growth.

We must grasp the full implications of the 2005 rejection of the Constitution. It was firstly the neurotic repudiation by the French of an initiative inspired by their country more than any other and which benefited it more than any other. More generally, the non resulted from an anxious questioning of the contemporary world. The European crisis is linked to the political decision-making crisis in the democracies. When chauvinists lament that Europe is nibbling away at the sovereignty of the nation, do they not see that sovereignty is lost every day when democratically elected governments retreat in the face of mob challenge, when any reform is questioned in the name of the rights of minorities or other groups to protest, when consultation is transformed into co-decision to the benefit of non-elected representatives of special interests or principles, and when civil servants exercise a passive veto over parliamentary decisions by refusing to draft regulations for the application of laws which do not suit them? So the weight of Brussels only aggravates a paralysing malady of democratic government which afflicts all our nations in the Union, as well as others in the world. The lack of coordination within the Commission, which everyone complains of, merely reproduces at a European level the loss of the power of decision retained in each state by the head of the executive. Hence, much European dysfunction is a reflection of national ills, and remedying these would contribute to eliminating the other problems. To strengthen Europe we must strengthen national power. In the meantime, national politicians and Eurocrats suffer from the same disaffection, with the difference that national leaders are known and those of Brussels are largely anonymous–so they attract less opprobrium but have no chance of making themselves heard. And when they are called to account, it is not the presidents and ministers of the member states who stand up to defend them.