China’s missile forces have been discussed by policy makers and strategic analysts in the recent decades owing to Beijing’s institutional and technological amendments that played major factors in the missile development program. One important arm of Chinese military is the People Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) and its missile capabilities. Thus it becomes relevant in the present circumstances to discuss PLARF and its missile capabilities.

China’s dream and PLARF

China’s missile forces have undergone technological advancements owing to the President Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream that includes the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation ⁽¹⁾. Missiles are viewed as key component of Chinese military strategy. There are also speculations that China spends more on defence as defence budget than it announces. 

In September 2024, Beijing tested-fired into the South Pacific an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Dong Feng-31 AG (DF-31AG), an advanced version of the DF-31A ⁽²⁾. The missile was believed to have been fired from the Hainan Island, an unusual location for ICBM missile. For the first time, China reached a target of 11,700 kms away into the Pacific. What was surprising was that there was no permanent ICBM brigade deployed in the Hainan province ⁽³⁾. This test highlighted two important aspects.

China will continue to maintain ambiguity in its nuclear deterrence posture for strengthening deterrence. Mobility of the missile from the nearby brigade in Shaoyong–which is 800 kms away from Hainan provides a signalling that operationally, China is capable of launching ICBM into the Pacific through swift mobility from one region to another. Mobility of missile systems is one way to improve survivability of missile systems and through these tests, China is achieving this milestone to make their nuclear deterrence credible. The DF-31AG already possesses off-road capability and this successful test highlighted the efficacy of this feature in the missile ⁽⁴⁾.

Missile deterrence enables Beijing to maintain assertive posture in its foreign policy objectives by strengthening both land-based and maritime deterrence. Jinping views its missiles as “core force of China’s strategic deterrence, a strategic buttress for China’s position as a major power, and an important cornerstone for defending national security.” ⁽⁵⁾

This has led Beijing to elevate the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces (PLARF) established in 2016, now functioning as an advanced operational body of the previous Second Artillery Force established in 1966. The PLARF is focused on maintaining “strategic balance” between the Chinese forces and its adversaries. This elevation of the PLARF implied that missile force formed key constituent of China’s conventional and nuclear deterrence at tactical and strategic level. The PLARF is responsible for “enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as it build a strong and modernised rocket force.” ⁽⁶⁾

Chinese leadership, under Jinping views missiles beyond deterrence and considers such capabilities for combat purposes. A noteworthy fact is that Jinping visits missile brigades for inspection to learn about combat preparedness ⁽⁷⁾. These missile brigades belong to the People Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), a formation of the military structure dedicated to carry out the Communist Party of China’s desire to present China as a powerful nuclear weapon state. 

China has strengthened its conventional and nuclear deterrence with the possession of both ballistic missiles to cruise missiles. Its missile capabilities range from short range ones to intercontinental range ones. These improvements of possessing missiles belonging to all categories of ranges, strengthen China’s strategy of “limited nuclear deterrence.” This “limited nuclear deterrence” strategy has been a shift from the “minimum deterrence” strategy that Beijing previously adhered to. These shifts underlined the need for accuracy, counter-measures, high speeds and survivability options that add to their deterrent value. Testing and training of missile forces is one of the key requirements of conventional and nuclear deterrence, in case delivery systems are in the forms of missiles.

Military exercises, including that of the missile forces, form a crucial component of training that strengthens a state’s ability for signalling. In the recent times, PLARF has included Opposition Force (OPFOR) training representing its adversary in its missile exercises in order to ensure that its training and exercises are realistic and has taken into account the challenges that could be incurred from adversaries ⁽⁸⁾. In 2018, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted military drills that included scenarios of missile launches and joint fire operations in the Gobi Desert integrating the PLARF to improve interoperability and command structures ⁽⁹⁾. Missile tests are integral to military exercises and–according to the Ministry of National Defence (MND)–these tests are conducted in line with international law and international practices ⁽¹⁰⁾. Tests are usually done in lofted or depressed trajectory.

There are nine bases that are responsible for the functioning of the missile forces by coordinating under the Head Quarter of the PLARF based in Beijing. The Base 69 in Yinchaun oversees the training and testing of missile forces and systems respectively. Bases 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, and 66 at Huangshan, Kunming, Huaihua, Lanzhou, Shenyang, and Luoyang oversee missile operations in order to ensure that missile forces are both prepared for combat and have deterrent roles ⁽¹¹⁾. These bases are also responsible for replacement of missile systems. 

Base 67 is responsible for nuclear stockpile and is situated in Baoji. It can rapidly deploy warheads by rail, road and aerial means, while the base that is responsible for engineering is the Base 68 that extensively uses underground facilities that are hardened and deeply buried, therefore, difficult to be destroyed by enemy attacks. These tunnels are wide enough for large vehicles to be stationed as well as it possesses multiple exits for emergency exiting in times of attacks from adversaries. The task of Base 67 remains very crucial as nuclear warheads are not mated with their missile systems in China. These individual bases conduct their individual training based on their functional requirements ⁽¹²⁾.

These bases work with four departments: the Staff Department, the Political Work Department, Equipment Work Department, and the Logistic Department to make their day-to-day functions easy and without hurdles. The formal decision regarding the missile forces within the PLARF lie with the Standing Party Committee of the Central Military Committee that is branch of the CPC ⁽¹³⁾. The bases are functioning with the help of brigades under them that are responsible to undertake the tasks the bases have been assigned with. In the past few years, because there has been an increase in missile force structure, the number of brigades has also increased. 

These brigades have units functioning under them along with support regiments like training regiment, transport regiment, warhead regiment, repair and communications regiment ⁽¹⁴⁾. There are technical battalion, site management battalion, technical service battalion, telemetry and electronic counter-measures battalion like that in the Brigade 633 and Brigade 635 ⁽¹⁵⁾ respectively. All these support battalions make the brigade’s function an easy process. For instance, the technical battalions would be tasked with supporting launch of missile systems including loading of the missiles, injecting the propellant, and pre-launch testing ⁽¹⁶⁾. They could also be involved in mating of the warheads. The site management battalion would be responsible for underground facility management for preparation of missiles, while service battalion would be responsible for security, camouflage, concealment and deception as well as reporting ⁽¹⁷⁾. The role of the communications regiment is also very noteworthy and critical as they are responsible for continued communication through command channels for successful operations during times of crises.

The bases that are hosting intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) brigades like the Base 62, Base 63, Base 64, Base 66, except one, are accompanied by dual-capable DF-26 missile brigade to increase survivability of the ICBM forces. Only Base 63 is not hosting the DF-26 missiles, but there is a brigade that hosts land attack cruise missiles. Nuclear capable ICBMs, both silo-based and mobile ones need to be protected through a ‘defence by denial’ strategy. These “defence by denial” systems could also be offensive weapons like dual-capable missiles and cruise missiles that deny the adversary any scope of gaining any tactical advantage. These bases consist of silo-based and mobile missile systems. There is participation from all missile brigades in military exercises to ensure high-level preparedness for response with conventional as well as nuclear missiles in times of crises ⁽¹⁸⁾. In fact, missile exercises are conducted keeping in mind the nuclear as well as conventional roles of the missile forces.

Deterrence for silo-based missile capabilities has strengthened by focusing on qualitative and quantitative improvements of silos. The quantitative improvements in silos for silo-based missiles also imply that Beijing is focusing on dummy silos to confuse adversaries’ targeting strategies in times of crises. Not only are there silos built for operational purposes, but also for training purposes, for example, Jilantai ⁽¹⁹⁾. Silos are not only being built for liquid fuelled ICBM–the DF-5 advanced category–but also for the solid fuelled ICBMs. The increase in the number of silos is assumed to result in the increase in the number of brigades ⁽²⁰⁾ and the increase in silos is assumed to be the result of the increase in ICBM inventory ⁽²¹⁾.

All short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) have undergone technological advancements. These include missiles like the DF-11A, DF-11AZT (ground penetrating subvariant for hard and deeply buried targets), DF-15B and C with 850 kms and 725 kms range respectively, the DF-16A, B and G with the G version being more manoeuvrable ⁽²²⁾. The DF-17 missiles would have hypersonic glide vehicle mounted atop the ballistic missile to evade enemy missile defence capabilities.

China also possesses the medium range and intermediate ranges missile capabilities. In fact, a major bone of contention in the Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, when it was functioning, was China’s medium and intermediate range missile forces with nuclear capabilities. These missiles include the DF21-C with 1750 kms, DF-26 with 4000 kms (and may have replaced DF-21s in nuclear roles), DF-17 with DF-7Z Hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) and range of 1800-2500 kms. The warhead is powered by scramjet engine for greater speed and manoeuvrability and evasion. The DF-21D is an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) ⁽²³⁾, perfect to perform the role of anti-access area denial to attack adversaries’ naval assets at sea with ranges up to 1550 kms and capable of carrying Manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV).

Beijing’s MRBM forces have increased in stockpile over the past years ⁽²⁴⁾ and bases that were once meant for tests and training have converted into permanent operational bases ⁽²⁵⁾. The IRBM forces have also increased, owing to the increase in the DF-26 launchers. A study in the recent times has concluded that China could lose ninety-five percent of its ballistic and cruise missile arsenals if it signed a treaty similar to the INF Treaty ⁽²⁶⁾.

There is also an increase in ICBM launchers and according to reports it has surpassed the United States in the number of ICBM launchers ⁽²⁷⁾. Beijing has focused on liquid propelled ICBM capabilities like the DF-5 category missiles, due to their high launch to throe weight ratio, and hence, capable of travelling longer distances and ideal for silo-based deterrence. These include variants like the DF-5A, 5B and 5C with the latter two being capable of being MIRV-ed ⁽²⁸⁾. The heavier characteristics in the missile negate the range restrictions caused by Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). China’s DF-31 ICBM now has advanced versions like the DF-31A and the DF-31AG. Ranges of the DF-31A categories have been increased with technological advancements like the incorporation of lightened guidance ⁽²⁹⁾. DF-31 category missile systems may not be capable of carrying MIRVs though there are many debates on this. Nevertheless, the DF-41 ICBMs are MIRV capable.

The PLARF is also possessing ground-launched cruise missiles like the CJ-10 missiles with range of 1500 kms ⁽³⁰⁾. These cruise missiles strengthen PLARF conventional deterrence with the help of low-flying features providing stealth capabilities in the missile that help evade adversaries’ missile defence ⁽³¹⁾. 

Conclusion

Deterrence is not only possessing weapon systems that deter adversaries. Such weapon systems would need support systems to ensure that they are capable of operational tasks: whether for deterrence or for combat. The PLARF is successfully doing this task by providing manpower and support services to ensure that Beijing not only possesses conventional and nuclear missiles but they are credible which is ensured through adequate and proper training. ♦

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(27) Helfrich Emma, op. cit.
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(30) PLA Rocket Force, China Aerospace Studies Institute (www.airuniversity.af.edu/).
(31) « DH-10 / CJ-10 », Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, Janvier 2023 (https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/).