China is selling to India a range of manufactured products at prices that defy competition, is installing high-tech companies and buying up others that are in difficulty, and submitting tenders for port modernisation projects. Faced with this onslaught, India is being circumspect: naturally it wants to develop relations with its northern neighbour, but wants to be able to control them, and to settle the frontier questions. Citing security problems, it is being reticent about overly liberal trans-Himalayan and maritime exchanges, and is keeping China at arm’s length from its port modernisation programme. On the other hand, India is allowing some of its big industrial groups to set up in China, where it is expanding in the banking sector.
India-China: Difficulties in Cooperation
China’s presence is being increasingly felt in South Asian countries bordering India, in particular Pakistan and Bangladesh, as well as in countries on the fringes of the subcontinent such as Afghanistan and Myanmar. In India itself, China is making considerable effort to develop commercial trade and to establish factories, some jointly, and to participate in large infrastructure projects. Whilst officially New Delhi supports the development of relations with its giant northern neighbour, there is none the less considerable prudence, even mistrust, being shown in the face of China’s multifaceted and energetic ambitions in many sectors.
Land Routes
First, India means to limit trade over the recently reopened Nathu Pass in the Himalayas on the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet (Nathu La being Tibetan for The pass of the listening ears). The lists of products authorised for exportation and for importation are short. In the west, the Ladakhis are seeking a reopening of the 400-km border, or more accurately, the Line of Actual Control, shared with Tibet.(1) Five routes could be reopened, the first and easiest of which is that via Demchok along the Indus, where even now much Chinese merchandise passes illegally to end up on sale in the markets of Leh, the capital of Ladakh.
Opening this route would allow Ladakhis to reach Kailash Manasarovar, a place considered holy by Hindus, Buddhists and Jains alike, and certainly Beijing would like to re-establish links in the Ladakh region, principally in the valley of the Indus. New Delhi is stalling on this since Ladakh, currently isolated in winter because of snow blocking the high mountain passes used by the routes coming from Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh in the west, risks falling prey to China if the region gets used to receiving Chinese supplies along routes which are passable all year long. Beijing would not hesitate to emphasise the advances made in Tibet in order to woo the Ladakhis, who might then become dependent on the Chinese. The Ladakhi desire to end their geographic isolation could well win the day over their mistrust of a Chinese regime hostile to their religion. In the 1950s, India lost territory in Aksai Chin, the eastern part of Ladakh, and wishes at all costs to avoid finding itself once again in such a position of fait accompli.
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