Australia and France have both been at the forefront in adopting the Indo-Pacific as their conceptual frame of reference in understanding this region, although they have approached the idea from somewhat different angles, reflecting their different history and geographies. Both countries share underlying concerns about China’s hegemonic ambitions as well as concerns about a series of transnational security threats that could threaten the security and stability of smaller countries in the Indo-Pacific. This creates many imperatives for the two countries to work together and with others as Indo-Pacific partners. Key potential initiatives include areas such as maritime security (particularly in Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), environmental security and good ocean governance.

The Intersection of Australia and France’s Indo-Pacific Strategies

Australia has long been one of the most enthusiastic promoters of the Indo-Pacific concept, and in 2013 it was the first country to officially adopt the Indo-Pacific as its region. Previously, Australia had separate strategic approaches towards the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean/Middle East. But a unified strategy towards the Indo-Pacific region makes considerable sense for Australia given its geographic position at the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

The Indo-Pacific concept also has important implications for Australian perspectives on regional security partners, affecting Australian perceptions of its partnerships in the Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters. The most notable of these is the Quad, which functions as an Indo-Pacific balancing mechanism vis-à-vis China. Similarly, partners such as France are assessed for what they can contribute to security across the Indo-Pacific.

It also has important implications for Australia’s approach to the Indian Ocean. The security of vital Indian Ocean sea routes, for example, needs to be approached through understanding the dynamics of strategic competition among major Indo-Pacific powers. A major interruption to the sea routes that cross the Indian Ocean will likely be connected to events elsewhere, meaning that in many cases a localized response by Australia would not be adequate.

France has also been a leader in developing an Indo-Pacific strategy, particularly among European countries. France is the only European country that is part of the Indo-Pacific and it sees the Indo-Pacific as crucial to its interests. In addition is France’s status as a recognised global maritime power, including its conventional and nuclear naval capabilities, make it the EU’s leading blue water navy.

In 2014, in the French Ministry of Defence published La France et la sécurité en Asie-Pacifique which announced the country’s “rebalancing towards its Indo-Pacific strategic centre of gravity”. In 2018, President Emmanuel Macron gave a decisive boost to France’s Indo-Pacific vision in the speeches he made during visits to the Pacific, including to Australia’s Garden Island navy base.

France’s Indo-Pacific stance promotes active multilateralism and the defence of international law, including a strong emphasis on building strategic partnerships. France’s approach is also multidimensional in nature with a strong emphasis on climate change.

Paris has also advocated that partners in the Indo-Pacific should adopt a “third way” in addressing regional threats that differs from the hard power and sometimes confrontational approach purportedly used by Washington.

The Indian Ocean occupies a special place in France’s Indo-Pacific vision due to the presence of many military powers, growing strategic rivalry between India and China and many transnational security threats.

France’s vision of the Indo-Pacific has a strong African element. This African differs from Australia’s approach that currently excludes the western Indian Ocean from the Indo-Pacific. This was adopted by Australia as a way of re-focusing defence and diplomatic resources towards East Asia. That position could well change if there is a significant increase in major power competition in the western Indian Ocean.

But underlying some differences in Australia and France’s approach to the Indo-Pacific is a significant convergence in threat perceptions. There can be little doubt that a key factor in Australia and France’s Indo-Pacific strategies involves similar (if not identical) concerns about China’s assertive strategic behaviour in the around the region and a desire to avoid Chinese hegemony over Asia.

But there are also other important shared interests in the security and stability of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In both the Indian and Pacific Oceans, transnational maritime threats and climate change represent major and even existential threats to many countries. As leading maritime powers in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, there are many reasons for the two countries to work together to build a stable and prosperous region.

Imperatives to build an Indo-Pacific partnership

France took the first significant steps towards developing an Indo-Pacific partnership with Australia during President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Sydney in 2018. Then he advocated an “Indo-Pacific axis” among France, India, and Australia in order to counterbalance China’s hegemonic ambitions and its efforts to establish a new international order through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Macron saw France’s partnership with Australia as anchored in the agreements to develop and build a fleet of conventionally powered submarines for the Australian Navy, but this element of the relationship did not last.

The AUKUS technology sharing arrangement announced by Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom in September 2021, involving the supply of nuclear powered submarines to Australia in place of French-built submarines, came as a shock to France. There was much disappointment from Australia’s abrupt cancellation of the French submarine contract, including the financial losses involved. AUKUS was also essentially seen as an Anglo-Saxon construct which, like the Five Eyes intelligence arrangements, excluded France. The “hard power” focus of AUKUS also differed from France’s ambitions to work with key Indo-Pacific states to develop a “third way” of responding to the China.

AUKUS was an initiative conceived by Australia in early 2021 in order to gain access to key defence technologies that it required in a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment, which the Australian government likened to 1930s Europe. Canberra saw the cancellation of the French submarine contract as unfortunate but fully justified by the new existential threats faced by Australia. Only nuclear powered submarines could fill Australia’s strategic requirements in this new strategic environment.

Importantly, AUKUS is not a new defence alliance, but is a technology sharing arrangement among existing allies. Although there has been much focus on the supply of nuclear propulsion technology to Australia, other aspects of the arrangement may become just as important, including cooperation in the development of new technologies such as AI, quantum and new materials.

Despite angst in Paris over AUKUS, the convergence of Australia and France’s Indo-Pacific interests still creates imperatives for a strategic partnership. The election of a new centre-left government in Australia in May 2022 under Prime Minister Albanese provided an opportunity for the French government to move past the resentments created by AUKUS and rebuild the Indo-Pacific partnership.

Australia and France have long worked together in promoting prosperity and stability among the Pacific islands – which includes three French territories. This includes initiatives such as the successful “FRANZ” arrangement under which France, Australia and New Zealand work together to coordinate HADR assistance to Pacific islands in the case of natural disasters. Australia and France also have many shared interests in promoting political stability in the Pacific region, especially in light of several active separatist movements and China’s growing presence.

Australia-France cooperation in the Indian Ocean is more nascent. Of particular interest is the potential for the Australia-France relationship to form part of a new trilateral partnership between Australia, France and India with a particular focus on Indian Ocean security. The capabilities of the three countries and their interests in different parts of the Indian Ocean would seem to form a solid basis for them to work together to promote a secure and stable region.

Key areas of strategic cooperation in the Indian Ocean

Strategic cooperation between France and Australia should be further developed with an emphasis on the following areas:

– Maritime security, particularly in Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

– Environmental security and good ocean governance.

There will be many opportunities for cooperation in these and other areas. Specific initiatives could include the following:

• Maritime Domain Awareness: Working together and with partners such as India to build an Indian Ocean region-wide Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) system. This would include coordination of maritime surveillance activities and mutual access to facilities in Australia (including on the mainland and Cocos Island), India (including on the mainland and in the Andaman and Nicobar islands), on French La Reunion and elsewhere. The partners should also work to enhance the effectiveness of regional information sharing systems as well as the MDA capabilities of smaller countries.

• Regional Fisheries Governance: Enhancing regional arrangements for fisheries governance. This would include improving the effectiveness of regional fisheries organisations such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and national capabilities for fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS). Much can be learned from effective regional arrangements among Pacific Island countries.

• Regional Coordination in Environmental Security. Enhance existing groupings and create new structures for coordination of policies towards climate change and other environmental security threats.

• Oil Spill Mitigation: Develop regional coordination arrangements for planning and response to oil spills and other major shipping accidents. This could include development of region-wide models to predict oil spill behaviour and mechanisms for the coordination of oil spill responses. ♦