Setting foreign policy priorities is always one of the most challenging tasks that U.S. government officials face. In today’s competitive geopolitical climate, with crises heating up across the world, the difficulty of choosing which areas and issues matter most is greater than ever. Despite the Trump administration’s initial desire to avoid foreign entanglements and to focus its energy on domestic issues, the reality is that the United States remains a great and global power, with interests and commitments in many places. Rather than forgoing any engagement abroad, Washington is instead confronted with the task of choosing where and how best to allocate its limited resources and attention.

On this increasingly competitive list of priorities, the importance of the Indian Ocean region remains obvious. It’s a critical area for global trade and security, with around eight in ten maritime oil shipments traversing the ocean, in addition to much of the world’s cargo traffic⁽¹⁾. The region has a population of nearly three billion with an average age of 30, and is projected to continue growing rapidly⁽²⁾. Trade routes across the Indian Ocean connect disparate regions, with one estimate showing that almost 90,000 vessels carrying nearly 10 billion tons of cargo make their way to destinations in Asia, Africa, and Europe⁽³⁾.

The value of trade flows for outside powers including the United States and China raises the region’s importance, as witnessed by the U.S. effort to halt Houthi attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea⁽⁴⁾. Beijing relies heavily on the Strait of Malacca for both energy and goods trade, and its economy would be crippled if it lost access to the route⁽⁵⁾. As a result, China faces its own “Malacca Dilemma”, or the threat of a naval blockade of China’s sea lines of communication and trade in the Indian Ocean.

U.S. presence in the region is historically longstanding, including established bases at Diego Garcia and Djibouti and the Fifth Fleet’s headquarters in Bahrain⁽⁶⁾. The United States has also secured agreements for military maintenance and logistical support in several key locations, including Darwin, Singapore, Perth, and areas around Chennai⁽⁷⁾. The Indian Ocean takes on importance through its role in a potential U.S.-China conflict, during which Washington would likely look to cut off Chinese access to trade through the region.

In recent years, the role of the Indian Ocean region in U.S. foreign policy has shifted further to the forefront. The first Trump administration—taking a page out of Japan’s book—articulated the goal of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”. The term, meant to include India in a region whose center is the Western Pacific, subsequently grew ubiquitous in Washington. From the U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM) renaming as the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) under President Trump in 2018, to President Biden releasing the United States’ first Indo-Pacific strategy, “Indo-Pacific” wrapped the Indian Ocean into the priority region for U.S. foreign policy⁽⁸⁾.

That said, within the latest U.S. strategies—Biden’s National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Indo-Pacific Strategy (Trump’s National Defense Strategy remains forthcoming)—there is only one substantive mention of the “Indian Ocean.” Of the two theaters in “Indo-Pacific,” attention remains focused on the latter; the role of the northern Indian Ocean in supporting U.S. military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan has declined, as has the percentage of hydrocarbons imported into the United States from the Gulf⁽⁹⁾. U.S. strategists generally see the Indian Ocean as a secondary theater after the Western Pacific, or—at most—an arena for competition and potentially conflict with China.

While the region is important, current policy aims to avoid making it a primary focus that draws attention and resources away from the Pacific theater. Primary objectives in the region today include preventing piracy and illegal fishing, securing sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and ensuring the free flow of maritime trade⁽¹⁰⁾. In doing so, the United States attempts to deny Chinese dominance in the region and prevent Beijing from upending the regional order, as it is trying to do in the Pacific.

Beijing has undoubtedly expanded its military footprint in the Indian Ocean, driven in part by its “two oceans” strategy. The strategy has, since the early 2000s, directed the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to project power and protect Chinese interests in both the Pacific and Indian oceans. Since 2014, China has conducted regular military exercises in the eastern Indian Ocean and secured its own naval base in Djibouti⁽¹¹⁾. Some observers see these developments as relatively benign—China has significant overseas investments, and certainly wishes to wishes to protect energy supply lines, given that 80 percent of its imported oil flows through the Indian Ocean and Malacca Strait⁽¹²⁾. Others believe that China’s presence in the region creates more vulnerabilities than advantages for Beijing because of China’s relatively limited power projection capabilities in distant waters.

China might also wish, over time, to contest the United States and its partners’ presence in the region. The Pentagon believes that Beijing will likely continue to develop its military capabilities in the Indian Ocean, and could build the capacity for offensive operations in the future⁽¹³⁾. In any case, Washington would certainly work to deny Beijing a military foothold in the Seychelles, Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar, and restrict China’s ability to control the region.

The first Trump administration’s policy in the Indian Ocean, and in the wider Indo-Pacific, reflected more continuity than change with previous administrations. In 2017, Trump described China as a “strategic competitor” in his national security strategy, similar to previous U.S. strategies.⁽¹⁴⁾ U.S. policy had, for years, been premised on contesting Chinese influence by improving the military balance in the Western Pacific, restricting technology transfers, competing economically and diplomatically, and denying China strategic advantage in key areas, including the Indian Ocean. These efforts, coupled with economic protectionism at home, aimed to prevent China’s domination in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

Policymakers understand that their engagement with Indian Ocean nations can’t be all about China, even though it remains a primary driver for Washington. There is also interest in developing alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as in the 2022 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)—a rebranding of the earlier Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative—and the Blue Dot Network, launched in 2024⁽¹⁵⁾. Both projects have been met with middling levels of success, and Washington has also looked to partners in the region to act as counterweights. American policymakers have generally welcomed India’s expanding role as a regional power, seeing New Delhi as a natural counterweight to Chinese ambitions, though the U.S.-India relationship was thrown into doubt in mid-2025 over trade issues and the conflict in Kashmir. France’s historical ties and presence in the Indian Ocean through its overseas territories and military bases offer valuable partnership opportunities.

Current Trump administration policy toward China—and the world—is less consistent than has been the case over the previous decade. In September 2025, for instance, Trump accused Chinese President Xi Jinping of “conspiring against” the United States with Russia and North Korea⁽¹⁶⁾. Yet the current administration has also downplayed the national security concerns related to exporting advanced semiconductors to China, which most China hawks in Congress still vehemently oppose⁽¹⁷⁾. It has ardently tried to secure a trade deal with Beijing and a summit for fall 2025. The overall trajectory of U.S. foreign policy—from heavy use of tariffs, the dismantling of USAID and other foreign aid mechanisms, and uncertain relations with allies—reflects a new era.

Rather than pushing allies away, however, the United States should work closely with them to maintain its military, economic, and diplomatic presence in the Indian Ocean region.

India is the key strategic partner for the U.S. in the region. Military cooperation between the two countries has reached an all-time high. Congress designated India a “Major Defense Partner” in 2016, and in 2023 the two countries launched a bilateral Defense Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X) to increase strategic technology and defense industrial cooperation⁽¹⁸⁾. The United States has looked to build up Indian naval capabilities to improve its power projection and maritime security—though questions remain about Indian capacity in the region as compared to China, and what roles it would play in the maritime domain when India is focused on its contested land border. The partnership is also complicated by India’s persistent relationship with Russia, particularly in defense procurement and energy⁽¹⁹⁾. In a sharp downturn, the Trump administration imposed 50 percent tariffs in August 2025 as punishment for India’s purchase of Russian oil after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Senior administration officials talked down the Indian economy and insisted that Trump himself settled New Delhi’s recent conflict with Pakistan. As a result, despite the enduring interests in a close partnership, the degree of future trust and cooperation between Washington and New Delhi looks uncertain⁽²⁰⁾.

In addition to repairing relations with India, the United States should look to other partners in the region, including Australia, Japan, and France. Rather than pursuing new base access and porting agreements, as the United States has done in the Western Pacific with the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam, and Australia, Washington should leverage its partnerships in the Indian Ocean to enhance the United States’ role. The Quad’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative is an excellent start; the United States, India, Japan, and Australia can combine their intelligence assets, surveillance capabilities, and information-sharing protocols through the initiative to enhance collective security. Joint military operations, as well as investments in the naval and coast guard capabilities of close American partners, are two other lines of efforts that would act as force multipliers for American influence.

The Indian Ocean will not emerge as the top region on the crowded list of U.S. priorities, but it remains important nevertheless. To best manage its interests there, from competing with China to maintaining access to essential trade routes, Washington should focus on its partnerships and alliances to build a strong, sustained, and shared presence. ♦

(1) Baruah Darshana M., Labh Nitya and Greely Jessica, “Mapping the Indian Ocean Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 juin 2023 (https://carnegieendowment.org/).
(2) Davis Alexander E and Balls Jonathan N., The Indian Ocean Region in the 21^st Century: geopolitical, economic, and environmental ties, Australia India Institute, mars 2020 (https://aii.unimelb.edu.au/).
(3) Baruah Darshana M., Labh Nitya and Greely Jessica, op. cit.
(4) “Who are the Houthis and why is the US targeting them?” BBC, March 25^th 2025 (www.bbc.com/).
(5) “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?”, China Power (https://chinapower.csis.org/).
(6) Military Installations, Navy Support Facility Diego Garcia (https://installations.militaryonesource.mil/); America’s Navy, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (https://cnreurafcent.cnic.navy.mil/); Naval Sea Systems Command, Fifth Fleet (https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/RMC/FDRMC/Bahrain/WhyBahrain/OurMission/5thFleet/).
(7) Needham Kirsty, “US military, seeking strategic advantages, builds up Australia’s northern bases amid China tensions”, Reuters, July 26^th 2024 (www.reuters.com/). US Department of State, “US Security Cooperation With Singapore,” January 20^th 2025 (www.state.gov/). US Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S. Navy Ship Docks in Perth, Western Australia”, April 21^st 2022 (www.pacom.mil/). Thomas Richard, “US to make India into naval logistics hub for Indo-Pac region”, Naval Technology, June 23^rd 2023 (www.naval-technology.com/).
(8) Neuman Scott, “In Military Name Change, US Pacific Command Becomes US Indo-Pacific Command,” NPR, May 31^st 2018 (www.npr.org/). The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022 (https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf).
(9) The White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022 (https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/). US Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, October 2022 (https://media.defense.gov/).
(10) Indian Ocean Region Strategic Review Act of 2024, H.R. 8378, 118^th Cong. (2023-2024) (www.congress.gov/).
(11) Saha Rushali, “Prioritizing the Indian Ocean in US Indo-Pacific Strategy”, Stimson Center, February 3^rd 2023 (https://www.stimson.org/2023/prioritizing-the-indian-ocean-in-us-indo-pacific-strategy/).
(12) Baruah Darshana M., Labh Nitya and Greely Jessica, op. cit.
(13) US Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress”, 2024 (https://media.defense.gov/).
(14) Zha Daojiong et. al., “Trump’s National Security Strategy and China”, ChinaFile, December 19^th 2017 (https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/trumps-national-security-strategy-and-china).
(15) The White House, “FACT SHEET: Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment at the G7 Summit”, June 13^th 2024 (https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/). US Department of State, Blue Dot Network (https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network).
(16) Sarnoff Leah and Brennan David, “Trump says China conspiring against US with Putin, Kim meeting at military parade”, ABC News, September 3^rd 2025 (https://abcnews.go.com/).
(17) Hawkins Ari and Miller Gabby, “GOP microchip move draws White House opposition to defense measure”, Politico, September 17^th 2025 (www.politico.com/).
(18) Kronstadt K. Alan, India-US: Major Arms Transfers and Military Exercises, Congressional Research Service, March 17^th 2025 (https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12438).
(19) Jacob Happymon, “The Shocking Rift Between India and the United States,” Foreign Affairs, August 14^th 2025.
(20) Ibidem.