For many years, Australia largely neglected the Indian Ocean as the second of three oceans that surround the Australian continent. For many decades Australia focused on its neighbours in the Pacific and East Asia as key economic and security partners. Australia has a long history of being an active middle power in terms of organising and securing its region and it has long been a leading player in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

In contrast, Australia tended to play a much more passive role in the Indian Ocean. This is despite Australia’s crucial strategic interests in the Indian Ocean, and despite having the longest Indian Ocean coastline, the largest territorial waters and the largest EEZ by far of any Indian Ocean state.

Australia’s relatively passive approach to the Indian Ocean meant that its presence and relationships in this part of the world were much thinner than they should be. Australia did help found the Indian Ocean Rim Association in the 1990s. But apart from that, Australia has been less active than it could be in building regional architecture in the Indian Ocean.

However, it is now giving much greater attention to the Indian Ocean as part of a determination to make an active contribution to the regional strategic balance. The emergence of India as a major power, China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean and questions about the future leadership role of the United States creates conditions for instability and strategic rivalry – something that Australia very much wants to avoid.

Indeed, Australia is in the process of building in Fremantle on its Indian Ocean coast what will likely become its principal naval base for its most important strategic platforms. This is an indication of the seriousness of Australia’s concerns about Indian Ocean security. Australia’s approach to the Indian Ocean is very much guided by its Indo-Pacific strategy, through which it seeks to take a coherent and integrated strategic approach to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Indeed, Australia along with Japan, were key thought leaders in promoting the idea of the Indo-Pacific. In the Indian Ocean, Australia has long focused on relationships in Southeast Asia with countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia.

In recent years, as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, Australia has also focused on its relationships with India and France as key regional partners. India and France are two Indian Ocean countries that, along with Australia, have the capability to respond to a range of regional security threats and, just as importantly, a willingness to respond to threats that may occur far beyond their own borders. Australia, France and India also share many perspectives and concerns about the stability of our region.

Australia is also increasingly paying more attention to developing with smaller or developing states in the Indian Ocean, including countries in the eastern Indian Ocean such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Maldives. These smaller or less powerful partners are, in their own way, key elements in Australia’s Indian Ocean security strategy.

But for several reasons, Australia’s economic and security role in the western Indian Ocean is still much less developed than it should be. Indeed, Australia could play a much more important role in the western Indian Ocean, alongside partners such as France, India and Japan.

Australia’s Indian Ocean strategy

As mentioned, Australia’s approach to the Indian Ocean is founded in its Indo-Pacific strategy which sees regional security dynamics, particularly involving major powers, as part of broader Indo-Pacific dynamics. This makes sense for some things. For example, interactions between the United States and China in the Arabian Sea can only be understood as part of broader interactions between those countries across the Indo-Pacific.

But Australia’s approach to the Indian Ocean is more complicated than that. For many types of threats, for example, drug or people smuggling, the Indian Ocean has its own particular dynamics, which is often different from the dynamics in play in the Pacific. These types of threats are much better addressed with a particular understanding of the dynamics of Indian Ocean states.

This means that we need to have an Indian Ocean regional strategy as well as a broader Indo-Pacific strategy. This is true for Australia, and possibly also for countries like France.

Overall, Australia’s approach to the Indian Ocean emphasises the sovereign aspirations of countries in the region. In Perth last year, Foreign Minister Penny Wong described Australia’s vision for the Indian Ocean in the following terms:

“A region that is peaceful and predictable, that is governed by accepted rules and norms, where all of us can cooperate, trade and thrive. Where a larger country does not determine the fate of a smaller country. Where each country can pursue its own aspirations. Where no country dominates, and no country is dominated.”

Those principles underlie Australia’s current contribution to regional security by helping to build the sovereign national capabilities of its Indian Ocean partners. This also reflects the aspirations of many countries in the Indian Ocean region. We should work to build networks of cooperation, while also building sovereign national capabilities.

Australia and maritime domain awareness

Australia’s efforts to help develop the maritime security capabilities of Indian Ocean partners include bolstering their ability to uphold international norms and respond to a range of maritime threats. Importantly, it also involves enhancing their maritime domain awareness as an essential foundation for their ability to govern their maritime jurisdictions.

Building effective maritime domain awareness requires effective monitoring and surveillance capabilities and effective mechanisms for sharing of information and intelligence. These have now become an important focus for regional maritime security.

However, technological developments are now disrupting traditional approaches to building MDA. In particular, the proliferation of satellite-based sensing and computer analytics is creating a new information-rich environment. This will have significant consequences for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean.

Regional architecture in the Indian Ocean

As many of us know, the level of regional organisation of the Indian Ocean tends to be relatively weak compared with many other regions of the world.

For many years, the Indian Ocean has been the ‘wild west’ of the world’s oceans, a space where numerous maritime security threats affected some of the world’s most important trading lanes and the prosperity and stability of many countries. These challenges underline the need for Australia and its partners to support regional maritime security.

The Indian Ocean region is huge and diverse, including many developing countries with very limited resources. This creates particular challenges in building effective and well-resourced international groupings that can represent the interests of Indian Ocean states and help respond to crises.

There are several subregional groupings that play useful roles, including the Indian Ocean Commission and ASEAN. However, there is no effective trans-regional architecture that is well suited to respond to maritime security crises. This is for several reasons, including very limited resources and capabilities of most Indian Ocean countries, but also the important role of several large extra-regional powers such as the United States and China. In many cases this may limit the ability of Indian Ocean states to influence security crises involving major powers. The Indian Ocean Rim Association is a useful forum for Indian Ocean states to meet and share perspectives, but let us not pretend for a moment that it would be effective in dealing with a regional crisis involving major powers.

But that is not the end of the story. There are important ways in which Indian Ocean countries can use a bottom-up approach to build networks for maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, which can have an important impact on the region.

One key area in which these networks can be built is in maritime domain awareness. For those who are not familiar with the term, maritime domain awareness involves the effective understanding of everything that is occurring in the maritime domain. Knowing what is happening in the maritime domain is essential for any country to govern their maritime spaces.

Without knowing what is happening in the oceans, whether it be the activities of illegal fishers, or people smugglers or drug smugglers, or a range of environmental threats, a country cannot respond effectively. Many Indian Ocean states have huge EEZs, often many times larger than their land territory. These represent major national resources.

However, the unfortunate truth is that many, even most, of these countries have little idea of what is happening in their maritime spaces. That means that their large maritime jurisdictions are effectively ungoverned.

Building regional information sharing systems

This is why many countries are putting a lot of effort into building systems for sharing of maritime information. This is a key step for countries to understand what is happening in their maritime space, whether it be the imminent arrival of a drug smuggling vessel, the location of illegal fishers or the occurrence of a natural disaster such as a Tsunami. Sharing information helps create effective maritime domain awareness which in turn allows a country to respond to threats.

The Indian Ocean Commission, which includes La Reunion as a member, has been very active in developing information sharing among its partners. The Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre or RMIFC in Madagascar and Regional Coordination Operations Centre or RCOC in Seychelles, are great examples of ways in which countries can pool their resources to build better MDA and also collectively respond to maritime security threats.

The systems being built by countries in the western Indian Ocean provide valuable lessons for countries around the Indian Ocean, particularly about the need to build systems to coordinate responses to maritime threats.

Of course, it is not enough for a country just to know that a threat exists. They must be able to do something about it. Unfortunately, responding to all threats may be beyond the resources of many countries, and they will need to rely on regional partners. The RCOC in Seychelles provides a very interesting model for how countries can work together to build a collective response mechanism.

Australia-France collaboration

What does this mean for collaboration between Australia and France in the Indian Ocean?

Australia and France are two Indian Ocean countries which, along with India, have the capabilities to respond to a wide range of maritime security threats, including those that may be a long way from their shores. They are also countries with long traditions of being prepared to act against security challenges all over the world.

This means that Australia and France can play key roles in building regional mechanisms for cooperation.

France has announced some valuable initiatives in this area, including the establishment of a Regional Maritime Studies Centre in Colombo, which is intended to provide training to maritime security professionals from around the region. There may be opportunities for Australia to work with France in contributing to this initiative.

Australia can also play a much more active role in the western Indian Ocean through training activities and support for information sharing arrangements. Australia should also seek observer status with the Indian Ocean Commission.

There are also important ways that Australia and France, alongside countries such as India, can signal their determination to work together. One key area in maritime security is the sharing of facilities, particularly to enhance shared maritime domain awareness.

France has several defence bases in the western Indian Ocean, India has many in the central Indian Ocean and Australia has facilities in the eastern Indian Ocean. The sharing of facilities, so that ships and aircraft can easily use each other’s facilities will be a major step forward in increasing options of our countries to respond to a range of security threats.

France and India have been developing arrangements for sharing facilities, including visits of aircraft and ships. Similarly Australian and Indian aircraft regularly use each other’s facilities in India and Australia, most recently include a visit of Indian maritime patrol aircraft to Australia’s Cocos Island.

Sharing of facilities between Australia and France is less developed. French navy ships do of course visit Australian ports, including as part of the current deployment of the Charles de Gaulle to the region.

The sharing of facilities for maritime patrol aircraft sends a whole different sort of message to the region and potential adversaries. Coordination of maritime surveillance activities is an important way of sharing the load in our huge shared maritime space and in building a shared operating picture of what is occurring in our region.

It would be a major practical and symbolic step if French maritime patrol aircraft visited Australia’s Cocos Island and an Australian P8 aircraft visited La Reunion.

For those who are not familiar with Cocos. It is a small Australian territory that lies about half way between mainland Australia and Diego Garcia. Australia is in the process of upgrading the airfield there for use by heavy military aircraft. This makes it a very important link in the chain of military facilities across the Indian Ocean between Africa and Australia.

Mutual visits of aircraft is an important way of Australia and France signalling an intention to build a shared system for maritime surveillance. It would be a first step in enhancing the sharing of maritime information and intelligence from a range of sources, including satellite and undersea sensors. This information would also be used to benefit our partners throughout the region.

Developing practical cooperation between Australia, France and other regional partners is an example of building regional architecture from the bottom up.

As key Indian Ocean states, Australia and France, along with partners such as India, can play an important role in maintaining stability and security in the Indian Ocean region. This may involve moving beyond traditional areas of interest to build a cooperative network across the Indian Ocean. ♦